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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

ROBERT TODD WHITE,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 920248-CA
Priority No. 2

:

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The facts of this case support a state constitutional
ruling that this Court will review no-knock nighttime search
warrants and affidavits without deference to the magistrate, for
probable cause.
The no-knock nighttime search warrant issued here allowed
this most intrusive and dangerous kind of search of a home occupied
by presumably innocent citizens; there were no probable cause
suspects listed in the warrant.

Particularly because of the dangers

posed by no-knock nighttime search warrants, the magistrate should
not have issued this warrant, which included an ambiguous
description of the place to be searched, did not follow statutory
mandates for searches involving no probable cause suspects, and was
supported by an inadequate affidavit.
There was no basis for a no-knock search warrant.

While

the daytime execution of the warrant apparently rendered the
improper nighttime authorization harmless in this case, this Court
should nonetheless publish an opinion explaining the error, so that

the magistrate will not put citizens and police in unnecessary
danger in the future by improperly authorizing nighttime searches.

ARGUMENT
I.
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT DEFER TO THE MAGISTRATE,
BUT SHOULD REVIEW THE AFFIDAVIT SEEKING A
NO-KNOCK NIGHTTIME SEARCH WARRANT FOR PROBABLE CAUSE.
The State argues that in no-knock nighttime search warrant
cases, deference should flow from this Court to the trial court to
the magistrate to the police.

Respondent's brief at 13-15, 21.

This danger posed by such a reversal of constitutional norms1 is
demonstrated by the testimony of the officer who obtained the
no-knock nighttime search warrant in this case:
Last nighttime I did, someone got killed, and he
was supposed to be asleep. So you take your best
pick. I firmly believe it's safer at night if
there's going to be violence.
(T. 29). The fact that the trial court heard this testimony and
then explicitly deferred to "police expertise" in affirming the
issuance of this improperly issued no-knock nighttime search warrant
demonstrates that the judicial actors and police need guidance, not

1. While it is true that under federal standards, courts
defer to magistrates who issue search warrants, no deference is
given to trial courts reviewing the issuance of search warrants.
E.g. State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830 (Utah App. 1991). The idea of
deferring to the police who seek the warrants goes against the
constitutional doctrine that search warrants are to be evaluated by
neutral and detached magistrates, who do not defer to police
expertise, but make an independent factual analysis of probable
cause for the issuance of the warrant. This neutral and detached
magistrate concept is part of federal and state constitutional law.
E.g. Allen v. Lindbeck, 93 P.2d 920 (Utah 1939); Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983).
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deference, from this Court.
It should be noted that the justification that the State
presents for deferential appellate review of search warrants differs
considerably from the United States Supreme Court's.

The reason

that the federal review of search warrants is deferential is that
the United States Supreme Court is afraid that if reviewing courts
enforce the Federal Constitution, the police will be discouraged
from seeking warrants altogether.

With the "substantial basis"

deferential standard of review for search warrants, the Court
perversely compromises constitutional standards to encourage police
to follow the law.

See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983).

In contrast, the State argues,
[A]ppellate deference is proper, as a matter of
respect for magistrates and trial court judges.
Those judicial officers, sworn to uphold the
federal and state constitutions in a fashion that
favors neither the State nor criminal suspects,
should be presumed to have done so absent the
clearest showing to the contrary.
Brief of respondent at 13.2

2. The State has explored many different justifications for
the federal substantial basis test in two other cases, but has not
espoused the Supreme Court's position. In State v. Ruiz, Case No.
910514-CA, the State argued that deferential review was appropriate
because it would promote consistent results and because the police
who execute the warrants place themselves in danger and therefore
deserve deference. Ruiz Respondent's brief at at 15-16. In State
v. Rosenbaum, the State argued that the deferential substantial
basis test was appropriate because magistrates are sworn to uphold
the constitutions, because non-deferential appellate review might
cause the magistrates to issue the warrants without analysis,
because magistrates may be more objective than reviewing courts,
because deferential review promotes consistent results, and because
non-deferential appellate review is more likely to set guilty
defendants free. Rosenbaum Respondent's brief at 13-14.
-3 -

If the trial courts are deferring to the issuance of the
warrants under the Gates analysis, they are not enforcing the
constitutions.

This Court can determine whether the police,

magistrates and trial courts are upholding their constitutional
duties by simply reading no-knock nighttime search warrants and
affidavits for probable cause, without any presumptions or pretenses.
Because of this Court's ability to publish opinions to
guide the lower courts, magistrates, and police in these critical
cases, this Court should review no-knock nighttime search warrants
without deference to those who have drafted and signed and perhaps
read those documents before.

Constitution of Utah, Article I

section 14.
The State argues that this issue was waived because it was
not presented to the trial court by trial counsel.
Respondent at 11-13.

Brief of

The trial court has no authority over this

Court's standards of review, and the fact that the trial court did
not have the opportunity to address this issue is irrelevant.

II.
THE AFFIDAVIT DOES NOT PROVIDE PROBABLE CAUSE
OR A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE
NO-KNOCK NIGHTTIME SEARCH WARRANT.
The State argues that there is no particularity problem
with search warrant and affidavit, stating, "Clearly, apartment 3720
was to be searched; apartment 3718 was to be left alone."
respondent at 19.

Brief of

The particularity of the warrant is for this

Court decide, by reading, with an eye to the dangers posed by
no-knock nighttime searches, the description of the premises to be
-4 -

searched contained in the warrant and affidavit:
the premises known as 3720 South 3375 West, the
duplex on the west side of the road, 3720 is the
southern most half of the duplex, the apartment
to the north has the numbers 3718 on the front of
the premises, to include all containers, rooms,
attics, and basements found therein.
(R. 25).
The State dismisses Mr. White's argument that pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-3, the warrant should not have issued
unless the magistrate found that the search could not be performed
by subpoena, and unless the magistrate tailored the scope of the
warrant to protect the rights of the residents of the premises to be
searched who were not probable cause suspects.

The State does not

address the magistrate's failure to tailor the scope of the search,
but argues that the subpoena finding required by the statute would
have been superfluous, stating,
Briefly, it seems unlikely that someone suspected
of dealing in illicit drugs would comply with a
subpoena requiring him or her to surrender
evidence of such activity. Indeed, unless such a
person were foolish beyond belief, he or she
would be expected, upon receiving such a
subpoena, to expeditiously conceal or destroy
such evidence. Recitation of the likely failure
of the subpoena process, then hardly seems
necessary in a case like this one.
Respondent's brief at 19.
This argument would best be made to the legislature who
enacted section 77-23-3 into law.
The State argument is flawed, in that it assumes that the
subpoena would go to a probable cause suspect, who would be unlikely
to incriminate himself.

The whole point of the statute is that
-5 -

innocent people may be jeopardized by their proximity to evidence,
and should be protected from unnecessary or unreasonable searches
and seizures.

The warrant in this case authorized a no-knock

nighttime search of a residence, without alleging any probable cause
suspects.

In fact, the two residents listed on utility bills, as

indicated in the affidavit, Brian Zeleniak and Cullen McCarty, were
not charged.

Innocent citizens are unnecessarily put at risk in

circumstances such as these, wherein a magistrate rubberstamped a
no-knock nighttime search warrant.
While it is true that trial counsel did not address the
lack of particularity of the search warrant, Respondent's brief at
18-19, this Court does not review the analysis of trial courts in
assessing the issuance of search warrants, but simply reviews the
warrants and affidavits.
App. 1991).

E.g. State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830 (Utah

The errors are plain on the face of the warrant and

affidavit, and in light of the governing law.

The particularity

errors constitute constitutional violations, and are therefore
prejudicial.

See State v. Rowe. 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 15 (Utah

1992)(defining constitutional violations as prejudicial).

This

Court should reach these errors under the plain error doctrine, in
the event that traditional waiver doctrines become applicable to
review of the issuance of search warrants.

See State v. Verde, 770

P.2d 116, 121 (Utah 1989)(plain errors meriting reversal on appeal
in the absence of an objection in the trial court are those that are
harmful ("there is a reasonable likelihood that the errors affected
the outcome"), and should have been obvious to the trial court);
-6 -

State v, Eldredcre. 773 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah) ("[T]he more harmful
an error is, the more likely an appellate court is to conclude that
it was objectively obvious, because a high degree of harmfulness
might be expected to attract a trial court's attention.

On the

other hand, in appropriate cases we can exercise our discretion to
dispense with the requirement of obviousness so that justice can be
done, as when an error not readily apparent to the court or counsel
proves harmful in retrospect."), cert, denied. 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989).
In seeking to demonstrate the reliability of the
confidential informants in the affidavit, the State argues that the
confidential informants should be viewed as reliable citizen
informants, speculating that the confidential informants were
motivated by love and concern for the spouse who was buying
cocaine.

Respondent's brief at 17.

in the affidavit.

Such speculation is unfounded

In fact, it appears from the affidavit that the

first confidential informant may have been in jeopardy for arranging
to distribute a Schedule II controlled substance, a second degree
felony.

Utah Code Ann. section 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) and (b)(i). The

confidential informants' credibility is hardly buttressed by the
fact that the spouse had been arrested for some narcotics charge
before, or the detective's observation of what he perceived as drug
traffic around the "named premises."

An arrest does not indicate

guilt, and the suspicious traffic alleged in the affidavit is not
tied to either side of the duplex, and is equally consistent with
tupperware dealings as with dealings in illegal drugs.
On pages 16 through 17 of the Respondent's brief, the State
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argues that because the trial court generously allowed the
presentation of evidence at the hearing on the motion to suppress
and because the police generously identified the confidential
informants, counsel for Mr. White should have presented and examined
the confidential informants to demonstrate their unreliability.
Respondents brief at 16-17.

The motion to suppress was based on

the magistrate's improper issuance of the no-knock nighttime search
warrant (R. 21-23).

Presentation and examination of evidence in

addition to the search warrant and affidavit was therefore
unnecessary.

E.g., Gates. supra.

While the prosecutor did not

object to the unnecessary testimony of Detective McCarthy, this did
not create a burden for Mr. White to present additional irrelevant
witnesses.
The State argues in summary in point one of its brief that
the totality of the circumstances provide a substantial basis for
the magistrate's issuance of the search warrant.

Respondent's brief

at 19-20. What the State fails to address in this summary is that
the magistrate issued a no-knock nighttime search Wcirrant to search
a residence that was ambiguously described in the warrant, and
apparently occupied by innocent citizens.

The affidavit failed to

protect the constitutional and statutory rights of these citizens,
or to establish the reliability of the confidential informants, who
had never witnessed any drug transactions in the residence.

If

these factors are properly overlooked under the deferential
"substantial basis" test, this is further reason for this Court to
reject the federal standard and rule under Article I section 14 of
-8 -

the Utah Constitution that in reviewing no-knock nighttime search
warrants, this Court will review without deference for probable
cause.

III.
THE MAGISTRATE SHOULD NOT HAVE AUTHORIZED
A NO-KNOCK NIGHTTIME SEARCH.
The State argues that no-knock authorizations should not
have to meet the probable cause standard, but should be issued with
deference to the police requesting the authorizations, if the
officers present "some evidence" justifying the authorizations.
Respondent's brief at 20-22.
The State and Federal Constitutions both explicitly require
reasonable searches and probable cause for all search warrants.
Because no-knock searches are more intrusive, more dangerous and
more prone to constitutional unreasonableness than other searches,
the constitutions and logic compel as a minimum a showing of
probable cause to justify no-knock search warrants, and certainly do
not tolerate the miniscule "some evidence" standard proposed by the
State.

See generally Lafave, Search and Seizure, §§4.7 and 4.8 at

pages 260, 263-276, 270-280, 287-290; supplement, §4.8 at 49-54.
The case the State cites in support of its "some evidence"
standard is inapposite.

In Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238

(1979), cited in respondent's brief at 21, the Court held, in
pertinent part, that the Fourth Amendment did not require courts
issuing wiretap orders under federal law to explicitly authorize
covert entry for installation of the wiretap equipment.
-9 -

Id. at

257-259.

Dalia's holding does not support the argument that

magistrates should defer to the police in no-knock nighttime search
warrant cases, because the facts at issue in wiretapping are
different from the facts at issue in no-knock nighttime cases.
Covert entry is essential to any successful wiretap and would
necessarily be considered by a judge issuing a wiretap order, and
covert entry does not pose the dangers that inhere in no-knock
nighttime searches.

See LaFave, Search and Seizure, supplement §4.8

at 53-54.
The State also argues that Mr. White failed to present
evidence for an adequate consideration of the reasonableness of the
no-knock search.

Respondent's brief at 24-25.

Again, Mr. White was

not moving to suppress the evidence on the basis of an unreasonable
search; he was moving to suppress the evidence because the no-knock
nighttime search was not supported by probable cause (R. 21-23).
Mr. White had no burden to present evidence relating to the
reasonableness of the search, for he was raising a separate
constitutional issue.

See e.g. Utah Constitution Article I section

14 (requiring both reasonable searches and the proper issuance of
warrants); United States Constitution, Amendment IV (same); State v.
Ayala. 762 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah App. 1988)(defendant challenged
search warrant for lack of probable cause established in the
supporting affidavit, and the reasonableness of the search of his
person).
The State concedes that because the Detective McCarthy's
affidavit did not seek narcotics, but only packaging materials and
-10-

other proof a "a major sales operation," the no-knock issuance
cannot be supported by the theory that the authorization was
necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence.
brief at 23-24.

Respondent's

Apparently, the State is conceding that the search

warrant affidavit incorrectly indicated that "the property sought
may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted." (R. 34). The
magistrate signed off on this warrant, and the trial court affirmed
the issuance of the warrant on the basis that cocaine, which was not
sought in the affidavit, is readily destructible (T. 67). Again,
the facts of this case demonstrate that the police, magistrates, and
trial courts need guidance, not deference, from this Court.
The State argues that the no-knock authorization was
justified by Detective McCarthy's personal feeling that no-knock
searches are always safer in drug cases.

Respondent's brief at 22.

While it is true that Utah's appellate courts have recognized that
narcotics dealers are frequently armed, id., innocent people are
frequently armed in this State with the broadest state
constitutional right to keep and bear arms in the nation.

See reply

brief of appellant in State v. Archambeau. Case no. 900564-CA.
The State's argument overlooks the fact that Utah and
Federal Constitutional law require magistrates to evaluate the
issuance of warrants on the basis of actual facts from which the
magistrates can draw their own conclusions.

Allen v. Lindbeck,

Gates, supra.
The State characterizes as "slender" the dangers posed by
the vague threats from the alleged cocaine dealers to the spouse,
-11-

and from the spouse to the confidential informant, but cites State
v, Rovbal. 716 P.2d 291 (Utah 1986), for the proposition that the
detective's no-knock authorization request was reasonable and
sufficient to justify the no-knock authorization.
brief at 23.

Respondent's

The Roybal case is inapposite because it involved a

Terry frisk# rather than the issuance of a warrant, and involved a
much heavier, much more specific and more imminent danger to the
officer than is reflected in this affidavit.

Compare the White

Affidavit at 31 ("CI told your affiant that the CI has been
threatened by the spouse if the CI came forward to the police with
the information provided.

Further the CI was told by the spouse

that the supplier of the cocaine has threatened the spouse when the
spouse has been late in repaying for cocaine that was received by
the spouse.) with Rovbal at 292 (Officer responded to residence at
2:00 a.m. to investigate family fight, where shots were fired,
defendant was arrested and later frisked on the street by police who
thought he was still in custody; gun from fight was never recovered
and defendant appeared to be hiding something when he was frisked).
Generalized stereotypical suspicions such are alleged in
this affidavit are insufficient to justify breaking into this
residence.

Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-10.

The State is persuasive in its argument that the daytime
execution of this search warrant rendered harmless the erroneous
nighttime authorization.

Respondent's brief at 25-27.

However, the

magistrate who signed this warrant must be informed for safety's
sake that the legislature's prerequisites to the issuance of
-12-

no-knock nighttime search warrants are law which the magistrate must
follow.

This Court should publish an opinion to this effect.

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the trial court's denial of
Mr. White's motion to suppress and remand this case to the trial
court for further proceedings.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ///

day of Nov., 1992.
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